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Abstract
Abstract: The successful invasion of a multi-species resident sys-
tem by mutants has received a great deal of attention in theoretical
ecology but less is known about what happens after the successful in-
vasion. Here, in the framework of Lotka-Volterra (LV) systems, we
consider the general question where there is one resident phenotype in
each species and the evolutionary outcome after invasion remains one
phenotype in each species but these include all the mutant phenotype-
s. In the first case, called evolutionary substitution, a mutant appears
in only one species, the resident phenotype in this species dies out and
the mutant coexists with the original phenotypes of the other species.
In the second case, called evolutionary replacement, a mutant appears
in each species, all resident phenotypes die out and the evolutionary
outcome is coexistence among all the mutant phenotypes. For general
LV systems, we show that dominance of the resident phenotype by
the mutant (i.e. the mutant is always more fit) in each species where
the mutant appears leads to evolutionary substitution/replacement.
However, it is shown by example that, when dominance is weakened
to only assuming the average fitness of the mutants is greater than
the average for the resident phenotype, the residents may not die out.
We also show evolutionary substitution occurs in two-species com-
petitive LV systems when the initial invasion of the resident system
(respectively, of the new coexistence system) is successful (respective-
ly, unsuccessful). Moreover, if sequential evolutionary substitution
occurs for either order that the two mutant phenotypes appear (called
historically independent replacement), then it is shown evolutionary
replacement occurs using a generalization of the dominance argument.
Keywords: resident and mutant phenotypes, successful invasion, evolution-
arily stable strategy, competitive Lotka-Volterra systems
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1 Introduction1
In this paper, we consider a resident system with N species together with2
a set of invaders. In order to motivate this setup, which is rooted in ecol-3
ogy and evolution theory, we provide relevant examples here. In ecological4
succession, after a disturbance (e.g. wildfire, lava flow or landslide), species5
from an existing pool colonize the new habitat. During the succession pro-6
cess, which starts with these pioneering plants and animals and stops when7
a long-term stable community emerges, a number of species replace other8
ones (Pielou 1966; Drake 1990). In ecological invasion theory, the hypothesis9
of “invasional meltdown” proposes that an invasive species in a new envi-10
ronment can facilitate the invasion of other non-native species (Simberloff11
and Von Holle 1999). However, there are also examples when multispecies12
invasion can reduce the negative impact of a single exotic plant species on13
the native (i.e. resident) plant community (Lenda 2019).14
Invasion by multiple species can happen through human activity or by15
natural causes. For instance, the latter occurred during the formation of the16
Isthmus of Panama when the migration between North and South America17
led to the last and most conspicuous wave, the great American interchange,18
around 3 million years ago (O’Dea et al. 2016; Stehli and Webb 2013). Fur-19
thermore, sympatric speciation is the evolution of a new species from a sur-20
viving ancestral species, while both live in the same habitat. An important21
question is: What is the number of mutants in a large ecosystem? The num-22
ber of co-existing mutants depends on the size of the ancestral species and23
the time duration until extinction of non-successful mutants. In particular,24
we cannot rule out the possibility that an already introduced non-successful25
mutant can survive if a new mutant arises in another species, and together26
can successfully invade the ancestral system.27
From the biological perspective, there are two main differences between28
evolutionary and ecological models. Firstly, in evolution, mutation is rare29
in two senses; the mutant occurs with low density, and there is a long time30
duration between two mutation events. In ecological models, more than one31
invasive species can be introduced at (almost) the same time and in large32
numbers either by accident or on purpose through human activities. Second-33
ly, in evolution, the mutant phenotypes are not arbitrary, contrary to ecology34
where the invasive species has arbitrary traits. Usually, during evolution, the35
mutant and the wild phenotypes do not radically differ from each other. Of-36
ten, the interaction parameters in the evolutionary model either come from37
3
the same game and the phenotypes are different (see Cressman and Garay38
2003a,b; Garay 2007) or interaction parameters between resident and mutant39
phenotypes are not so different. This contrasts to models in invasion ecology40
where the phenotypic similarity between exotic and native species cannot be41
assumed. One well-known example of dissimilar phenotypes is from Australi-42
a, when the invasive mammals substitute for the native marsupials. However,43
Hutchinson (1965) has already emphasized that biotic evolution cannot be44
separated from ecology, since ecological factors (like competition and feed-45
ing) have a curtailing effect on the evolutionary success of all mutants and/or46
species.47
From the mathematical point of view, the examples mentioned above48
can be modelled by a dynamical system where several invaders appear in49
a resident system (with N species). For simplicity, we concentrate on the50
case when there is maximum of N invaders. In essence: invaders (whether51
they migrate from another ecosystem or are mutants) are introduced into52
any ecosystem, it is the ecological interactions that determine whether the53
new ecotypes die out or replace some resident species in the long run.54
In the short term, one of the fundamental results of theoretical ecology55
that has received a great deal of attention in the literature (e.g. Shigesada56
et al, 1984; van den Driessche and Zeeman, 1998) is the characterization57
of the successful invasion of a stable N−species resident system by mutant58
phenotypes. Less attention has been placed on the question of what happens59
after the successful invasion. Possible outcomes include situations where both60
residents and mutants coexist in all or some species (either by approaching a61
stable coexistence equilibrium or through more complicated dynamics such62
a periodic cycles) (Zeeman, 1993). It is also possible that the ecosystem63
collapses through species extinction (e.g. evolutionary suicide (Gyllenberg64
and Parvinen, 2001)).65
In this paper, we are more interested in the outcome whereby the resident66
phenotype dies out and is replaced by the mutant phenotype. We examine67
necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for two such situations. In the68
first, there is a single mutant phenotype in one of the species. That is, we69
consider the case where mutation is rare so that multiple mutant phenotypes70
either in the same species or in several species cannot occur at the same time.71
If the mutant can invade a stable equilibrium of the monomorphic N−species72
resident system that has all species present and the system evolves to a stable73
equilibrium of the N−species resident-mutant system with all species present74
but the one species has only the mutant phenotype, we say that “evolutionary75
4
substitution” has occurred.76
At the other extreme, there are mutant phenotypes in each of the species.77
In this second case, if a stable equilibrium of the monomorphic N−species78
resident system that has all species present can be invaded by the mutants79
and the system evolves to a stable equilibrium of the N−species resident-80
mutant system with all species present but only mutant phenotypes, there81
has been an “evolutionary replacement”.82
Our investigation is based on the dynamics of evolving population sizes for83
the resident and mutant phenotypes of the N−species evolutionary ecology84
system that assumes these dynamics are of Lotka-Volterra (LV) type.1 This85
extends the work of Garay and Varga (2000) and Cressman and Garay86
(2003a) who investigated resident stability/invadability in such LV systems87
rather than substitution/replacement. In particular, the monomorphic model88
of Cressman and Garay (2003a) examines the invadability of the resident89
system when there is a single mutant phenotype in each species. As we90
will see, the methods developed there are also essential to our results on91
evolutionary substitution and replacement.92
In Section 2, we illustrate the problem by summarizing the theory for a93
single species. In Section 3, we investigate evolutionary substitution in the94
N−species LV resident-mutant dynamical system. Theorem 1 shows that,95
if the mutant can invade the N−species resident system but the resident96
phenotype cannot invade the equilibrium with all species present but the one97
species has only the mutant phenotype, then there can be no coexistence98
equilibrium with all phenotypes, an important requirement for evolutionary99
substitution to occur. Theorems 2 and 3 use this result to prove that these100
two invasion criteria combine to imply evolutionary substitution occurs for101
two-species competitive systems and for general N−species LV systems when102
the mutant phenotype dominates the resident.103
In Section 4, we concentrate on evolutionary replacement in two-species104
(i.e. N = 2) since Theorem 1 does not generalize to exclude coexistence105
equilibria when there are mutant phenotypes in both species (see Example 2106
of Section 4). Furthermore, Example 3 shows care must be taken extending107
1Here the resident and mutant phenotypes are fixed. Another approach to phenotype
evolution (that is not pursued in this article) is based on adaptive dynamics (Dercole and
Renaldi, 2008) with continuous phenotype space whereby the resident phenotypes change
continuously in the direction of nearby mutant phenotypes that can successful invade.
Adaptive dynamics also questions whether invasion leads to substitution/replacement (O-
ba and Kigami, 2018).
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the dominance concept of Section 3. However, if the successful invasions oc-108
cur through a sequence of evolutionary substitutions that does not depend on109
whether a rare mutant first appears in species one or in species two (which we110
call “historically independent replacement”), then evolutionary replacement111
ensues (see Theorem 4 there). The biological importance of this concept is112
illustrated at the end of Section 5. This final section also discusses other113
results of the paper from a biological perspective.114
2 Evolutionary Substitution and Replacemen-115
t in Single Species LV Systems116
To illustrate these evolutionary aspects, consider a single species (i.e. N = 1)117
with one resident and one mutant phenotype. In this case, evolutionary118
substitution and evolutionary replacement are equivalent since the question119
in both cases is whether the mutant phenotype becomes established in the120
system and the resident phenotype goes extinct.121
The resident system of Lotka-Volterra type is of the form122
ρ˙1 = ρ1
(
r1 +m
RR
11 ρ1
)
(1)
where ρ1 is the resident density, r1 is the intrinsic growth rate and m
RR
11 is123
the interaction parameter. Clearly, this system has a stable equilibrium with124
ρ∗1 > 0 (i.e. with the resident species present) if and only if the intrinsic125
growth is positive and the interaction term is negative (in which case, the126
equilibrium is ρ∗1 = −r1/mRR11 ).2127
We assume that the difference between resident and mutant behavior is128
contained in the interaction parameters (e.g. the parameter mRI11 models the129
linear effect that the mutant density µ1 has on the growth rate of the resident130
2The notation used here is consistent with the more complicated LV systems in the
remainder of the paper (e.g. (3) below) . It can be considerably simplified in this special
case. For instance, with r1 = r > 0 and m
RR
11 = m < 0, (1) is the logistic equation (i.e.
positive intrinsic growth and negative density dependence) in more standard notation.
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phenotype).3 The corresponding resident-mutant system is then131
ρ˙1 = ρ1
(
r1 +m
RR
11 ρ1 +m
RI
11 µ1
)
µ˙1 = µ1
(
r1 +m
IR
11 ρ1 +m
II
11µ1
)
.
(2)
If this models competition (i.e. all four interaction parameters are negative),132
it is well-known (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998) that the two-dimensional133
dynamical system evolves to the mutant equilibrium µ∗1 = −r1/mII11 if and134
only if the mutant can invade the resident equilibrium but the resident cannot135
invade the mutant equilibrium.136
We say that general LV systems of the form (2) exhibit evolutionary sub-137
stitution if (i) the one-dimensional resident system and mutant system respec-138
tively each have a stable equilibrium with positive density; (ii) the resident139
(respectively, mutant) equilibrium is unstable (respectively, stable) since it140
can be invaded by the mutant phenotype (respectively, cannot be invaded141
by the resident phenotype) in the two-dimensional resident-mutant system142
(2); and (iii) after the mutant successfully invades the resident, the system e-143
volves to the mutant equilibrium. In fact, these two-dimensional LV systems144
exhibit evolutionary substitution if and only if r1 > 0,m
RR
11 < 0,m
II
11 < 0145
(i.e. the resident system and the mutant system each have a globally stable146
equilibrium) and mIR11 ≥ mRR11 ,mII11 ≥ mRI11 with strict inequality in at least147
one of these two conditions.148
As interpreted by Cressman and Garay (2003a), r1 > 0,m
RR
11 < 0,m
II
11 < 0
are the ecological stability conditions and mII11 ≥ mRI11 with mIR11 > mRR11 if
mII11 = m
RI
11 means that the mutant phenotype is an evolutionarily stable s-
trategy (ESS). That is, in addition to ecological stability, we have evolution-
ary stability of the mutant phenotype since it is an ESS of the evolutionary
game given by the 2× 2 payoff matrix (or interaction matrix)[
mRR11 m
RI
11
mIR11 m
II
11
]
.
In game-theoretic terms (Apaloo, 2006), the final condition for evolutionary149
substitution (i.e. mIR11 ≥ mRR11 with mII11 > mRI11 if mIR11 = mRR11 ) is equivalent150
3That is, the intrinsic growth rate is independent of species phenotype. The discussion
here does not rely on this assumption. In fact, for the N−species systems of Sections 3
and 4, Theorems 1 to 4 do not depend on our assumption that, for each species k, the
resident and mutant phenotypes have the same intrinsic growth rate rk. Moreover, the
proofs of these results do not rely on this assumption either.
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to the mutant phenotype being a neighborhood invader strategy (NIS) of151
the resident phenotype (i.e. the mutant phenotype that is sufficiently rare152
successfully invades the resident phenotype). Strategies that satisfy both the153
ESS and NIS conditions for matrix games such as given by the 2× 2 payoff154
matrix above are known as ESNIS (Apaloo, 2006).155
In summary, there is evolutionary substitution/replacement in a single-156
species LV system if and only if157
(i) there is ecological stability in the resident system and in the mutant158
system159
(ii) the resident phenotype cannot invade the mutant phenotype (i.e. the160
mutant phenotype is an ESS of the interaction matrix for the resident-mutant161
evolutionary game), and162
(iii) the mutant phenotype can invade the resident phenotype (i.e. the163
mutant phenotype is a NIS of the resident phenotype for this interaction164
matrix).165
3 Evolutionary Substitution in N−Species166
In this section, we assume that the N−species resident system has one resi-167
dent phenotype in each species and that there is a single mutant phenotype168
in exactly one species (which, without loss of generality, we take as species169
one). If rk and ρk respectively are the intrinsic growth rate and resident phe-170
notype density of species k and µ1 is the density of the mutant phenotype,171
then the resident-mutant Lotka-Volterra system is172
ρ˙k = ρk
(
rk +
N∑
l=1
mRRkl ρl +m
RI
k1 µ1
)
(3)
µ˙1 = µ1
(
r1 +
N∑
l=1
mIR1l ρl +m
II
11µ1
)
where k = 1, ..., N . In particular, for LV systems, the individual growth rate173
of a given phenotype (e.g. ρ˙k/ρk) are linear functions of the densities of all174
phenotypes present in the system.175
One interpretation of the interaction parameters mRRkl ,m
RI
k1 ,m
IR
1l and m
II
11176
adopts the payoff terminology of evolutionary game theory (Cressman and177
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Garay, 2003a). Then mRRkl (respectively, m
RI
k1 ) is the payoff to a resident178
phenotype (or strategy) in species k when interacting with a resident pheno-179
type in species l (respectively, the intruder or mutant phenotype).4 Similarly,180
mIR1l and m
II
11 are payoffs to the mutant phenotype. That is, the superscripts181
denote the phenotypes and the subscripts are the species in the interaction182
where the first superscript and subscript specify the phenotype and species183
of the individual receiving the payoff, respectively184
The first requirement for evolutionary substitution is that this resident185
system is stable in the absence of mutants. In particular, from the biological186
perspective, this means that there is species coexistence in the residence187
system. Mathematically, there is a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium188
ρ∗ = (ρ∗1, ..., ρ
∗
N) with all components positive (i.e. ρ
∗ ∈ RN>0) for the resident189
system190
ρ˙k = ρk
(
rk +
N∑
l=1
mRRkl ρl
)
k = 1, ..., N. (4)
To avoid technical complications, we assume that this stability is determined191
through the linearization of (4) about ρ∗. That is, we assume that the resi-192
dent system is hyperbolic (i.e. all eigenvalues of the N ×N Jacobian matrix193
of this linearization, which has kl entry ρ∗km
RR
kl , have nonzero real parts).
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194
Thus this hyperbolic resident system is stable if and only if all eigenvalues195
of the Jacobian matrix have negative real parts. Let MRR be the N × N196
matrix whose entries are the payoffs mRRkl for interactions between residents197
(similarly, M IR denotes the 1 × N matrix of payoffs to mutants interacting198
with residents etc.). Then, in particular, MRR is invertible since its deter-199
minant is non-zero and so ρ∗ = − (MRR)−1 r where r is the column vector200
whose kth component is the intrinsic growth rate rk of species k.201
The next requirement is that the mutant phenotype can invade. That202
is, (ρ∗, 0) is not a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium of the resident-203
mutant system (3). (ρ∗, 0) will be unstable in the resident-mutant system204
if the invasion fitness λI1 ≡ r1 +
∑N
l=1m
IR
1l ρ
∗
l of the mutant phenotype at205
4In evolutionary game theory, it is usually assumed that each individual has one random
pairwise interaction per unit time. Here, the number of such interactions for an individual
is proportional to the density in each species.
5The Jacobian matrix at the resident equilibrium ρ∗ is
 ρ
∗
1 0 0
0
. . . 0
0 ρ∗N
MRR.
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this equilibrium is greater than the fitness of the resident phenotype r1 +206 ∑N
l=1m
RR
1l ρ
∗
l = 0 (i.e. if λ
I
1 > 0). On the other hand, (ρ
∗, 0) is locally207
asymptotically stable if λI1 < 0. In the intermediate case where λ
I
1 = 0, the208
mutant phenotype is initially selectively neutral when invading the resident209
equilibrium. This case was analyzed by Cressman and Garay (2003a, 2003b)210
who showed that, for Lotka-Volterra systems, (ρ∗, 0) is invadable if and only211
if M II −M IR (MRR)−1MRI ≥ 0.212
Finally, after successful invasion by the mutant, evolutionary substitution213
requires that the resident-mutant system must evolve to a locally asymptot-214
ically stable equilibrium (0, ρ̂2, ..., ρ̂N , µ̂1) with all species present but species215
one has only mutant phenotypes. In particular, this equilibrium cannot be216
invaded by the resident phenotype of species one. That is, the invasion fit-217
ness of the resident phenotype of species one, λR1 ≡ r1 +
∑N
l=2m
RR
1l ρ̂l+m
RI
11 µ̂1218
cannot be positive at (0, ρ̂2, ..., ρ̂N , µ̂1).
6
219
The question arises whether hyperbolic stability of ρ∗ and (ρ̂2, ..., ρ̂N , µ̂1)220
in their respective N− dimensional Lotka-Volterra systems (which we as-221
sume from now on) implies evolutionary substitution if the mutant phenotype222
can invade (ρ∗, 0) but the resident phenotype of species one cannot invade223
(0, ρ̂2, ..., ρ̂N , µ̂1). Such an implication would generalize the evolutionary sub-224
stitution in a single species discussed in Section 2. Our first result (Theorem225
1) implies that a unique coexistence equilibrium is impossible in this case.226
Theorem 1 Suppose that E1 ≡ (ρ∗, 0) and E2 ≡ (0, ρ̂2, ..., ρ̂N , µ̂1) are equi-227
libria of the N-species resident-mutant LV system (3) with all species present228
(i.e. ρ∗i > 0 for i = 1, 2, ..., N and ρ̂j > 0 for j = 2, ..., N and µ̂1 > 0). Also229
assume that E1 and E2 are locally asymptotically stable equilibria for system230
(3) restricted to their respective N−dimensional boundary face and that the231
mutant phenotype can invade E1 but the resident phenotype of species one232
cannot invade E2.
7 Then there is no isolated interior equilibrium8 for the233
N + 1 dimensional LV system.234
Proof. Let x∗ = (x∗1, x
∗
2, ..., x
∗
N , x
∗
N+1) be an isolated interior equilibrium
6In the threshold case when the resident phenotype is initially selectively neutral (i.e.
λR1 = 0), the analogue of M
II − M IR (MRR)−1MRI must now be negative (see the
B-matrix method of Cressman and Garay (2003a)).
7Under these assumptions, we say that the invasion conditions are satisfied.
8That is, every neigborhood of an equilibrium with all N + 1 components positive
contains another equilibrium.
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for (3), which for convenience, we rewrite as
x˙i = xi
(
ri +
N+1∑
j=1
aijxj
)
for i = 1, 2, ..., N + 1.
The isolatedness assumption implies that the (N + 1)× (N + 1) interaction235
matrix A with entries aij is invertible. An application of Cramer’s Rule (see,236
for instance the proof of Theorem 13.5.7 in Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998))237
shows that238
x∗i = −
| Ai |
| A |
(
ri + (Ax
i)i
)
(5)
whenever the principal submatrix Ai of A formed by deleting the ith row and239
column is nonsingular and, apart from the i-th coordinate which is then taken240
as xii = 0, the remaining coordinates of x
i = (xi1, . . . , x
i
i−1, 0, x
i
i+1, . . . , x
i
N+1)241
are defined as the coordinates of the unique solution to the linear system242
rj + (Ax)j = 0 for all j 6= i.243
From the assumptions in the statement of the theorem, x1 (respectively,
xN+1) is the equilibrium E2 (respectively, E1). Since x
1 and xN+1 are locally
asymptotically stable in their respective N−dimensional boundary faces, A1
and AN+1 are both nonsingular N×N matrices and their determinants | A1 |
and | AN+1 | have the same sign. Moreover, since the mutant phenotype
can invade the resident equilibrium, rN+1 + (Ax
N+1)N+1 ≥ 0 and since the
resident phenotype cannot invade the mutant equilibrium, r1 + (Ax
1)1 ≤ 0.
Thus
x∗1x
∗
N+1 =
| A1 || AN+1 |
| A |2
(
r1 + (Ax
1)1
) (
rN+1 + (Ax
N+1)N+1
) ≤ 0
which contradicts that x∗ is an interior equilibrium. 244
Remark 1. The proof of Theorem 1 above relies on the nonsingularity245
of A. For general A, (5) can be rewritten as246
| A | x∗i = − | Ai |
(
ri + (Ax
i)i
)
. (6)
In fact, this reformulation holds whenever Ai is nonsingular for any solution247
x∗ of Ax + r = 0 (see the proof in Appendix A1).9 Thus, if A is singular,248
9The first and fourth authors refer to this general result as the Calgary Lemma, the
location where they obtained its proof that has as yet been unpublished as far as they are
aware.
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then (ri + (Ax
i)i) = 0 whenever A
i is nonsingular (in particular, for i = 1249
and i = N +1). That is, λI1 = 0 = λ
R
1 . In this case, Ax
1 +r = 0 = AxN+1 +r250
and so the line segment joining E2 = x
1 and E1 = x
N+1 are all equilibria251
of the system (3). In particular, E2 is not locally asymptotically stable in252
the extended, (N + 1)−dimensional phase space since there are arbitrarily253
close initial points on this line segment that do not evolve to it (i.e. it can be254
invaded by the resident phenotype of species one). Thus, the conclusion of255
Theorem 1 can be strengthened to show that there is no interior equilibrium256
for the N + 1 dimensional LV system when the invasion conditions hold.257
For evolutionary substitution to occur, it is necessary that no interior258
equilibrium exists. However, the converse is not true. That is, evolutionary259
substitution is not guaranteed when there is no interior equilibrium as the260
following two-species example illustrates. In particular, ecological stability261
together with the invasion conditions of Theorem 1 do not imply evolutionary262
substitution unlike the single-species result of Section 2.263
Example 1 Consider the resident-mutant three-dimensional LV system264
ρ˙1 = ρ1(−4− 3ρ1 + 7ρ2 − 4µ1)
ρ˙2 = ρ2(−1− ρ1 + 2ρ2 − µ1) (7)
µ˙1 = µ1(−4 + 7ρ2 − 3µ1) .
It is readily checked that the conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied for265
N = 2, equilibria E1 = (ρ
∗
1, ρ
∗
2, 0) = (1, 1, 0), E2 = (0, ρ̂2, µ̂1) = (0, 1, 1) and266
λI1 = −4 + 7 = 3 > 0, λR1 = −4 + 7− 4 = −1 < 0. The equilibria of (7) are267
the origin O = (0, 0, 0), P+ = E2 (which are asymptotically stable
10) and the268
saddle points P− = E1 and S = (0, 12 , 0).269
The global dynamics of (7) as well as the dynamics of the resident sub-270
system271
ρ˙1 = ρ1(−4− 3ρ1 + 7ρ2)
ρ˙2 = ρ2(−1− ρ1 + 2ρ2) (8)
10Since 0 < ρ2 <
1
2 implies ρ˙2 < 0 and thus ρ˙2 < − 12ρ2 < 0 as well as µ˙1 < − 12µ1 < 0 ,
the origin attracts all points of the open, unbounded 3D rectangle 0 < ρ1 <∞, 0 < ρ2 < 12 ,
0 < µ1 <∞. The region of attraction of the origin is separated from the rest of the phase
portrait by (the non-negative part of) the two-dimensional, unbounded stable manifold of
the saddle point S.
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and of the mutant subsystem272
µ˙1 = µ1(−4− 3µ1 + 7ρ2)
ρ˙2 = ρ2(−1− µ1 + 2ρ2):, (9)
are presented in Figure 1. The three thick gray curves portray nonplanar273
trajectories, including the outgoing trajectory of P−. Due to lack of space,274
ingoing and outgoing trajectories of the saddle point S are not shown but275
clearly indicated by trajectories nearby. All black trajectory curves are planar.276
Orientation of the trajectories is determined by the stability properties of the277
equilibria. The behavior of the trajectories far from the origin is nontrivial278
and presented in Figure 2 of Appendix A2.279
When ρ1 in (8) is changed to µ1 in (9), it is immediate that the dynamics280
in the µ1-ρ2 plane is exactly the same as in the ρ1-ρ2 plane. Please observe281
this symmetry in both Figures.282
Figure 1: Phase portrait of the replicator system (7).
[ROSS: Please check that footnote 10 is placed where Barnabas intended283
it and that the figure is okay. The difference between the gray and black284
curves is not that great. Maybe the gray ones could be some other color285
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(red?) instead? I have inserted the sentence on orientation into the text286
since figure 1 does not have arrows on the trajectories.]287
By Example 1, the invasion criteria of Theorem 1 do not imply evolution-288
ary substitution for two-species LV systems. On the other hand, if the LV289
system has more structure, the invasion criteria of Theorem 1 can be equiv-290
alent to evolutionary substitution. The following discusses two such systems291
of biological importance.292
First, for two-species competitive LV systems, evolutionary substitution293
is equivalent to the invasion criteria. These resident-mutant systems have294
the form295
x˙i = xi
(
ri +
3∑
j=1
aijxj
)
for : i = 1, 2, 3 (10)
where r1 = r3 and r2 are all positive and aij < 0 for i, j = 1, 2, 3. By the296
discussion above, the invasion criteria are necessary for evolutionary substi-297
tution. The following theorem proves the converse. In fact, for such systems,298
the invasion criteria imply that E2 = (0, ρ̂2, µ̂1) is globally asymptotically299
stable.300
Theorem 2 Suppose that E1 ≡ (ρ∗1, ρ∗2, 0) and E2 ≡ (0, ρ̂2, µ̂1) are equilib-301
ria of the two-species resident-mutant competitive LV system (10) with both302
species present (i.e. ρ∗i > 0 for i = 1, 2, ρ̂2 > 0 and µ̂1 > 0) and satisfying303
r1 = r3 > 0, r2 > 0 and aij < 0 for i, j = 1, 2, 3. Also assume that E1304
and E2 are locally asymptotically stable equilibria for system (10) restricted305
to their respective two-dimensional boundary face. If the mutant phenotype306
can invade E1 but the resident phenotype of species one cannot invade E2,307
then E2 is globally asymptotically stable.
11
308
Proof. It is well-known (e.g. Zeeman, 1993) that the dynamic behavior of309
an N+1−dimensional competitive LV system is determined by its restriction310
to an invariant N−dimensional hypersurface called the carrying simplex (van311
den Driessche and Zeeman, 1998). For the three-dimensional system (10),312
the two-dimensional carrying simplex in the first octant is homeomorphic to313
a triangle whose three edges correspond to boundary invariant curves of (10)314
11Here, and everywhere else in the present paper, both for LV and replicator systems,
global asymptotic stability (gas) of an equilibrium means that it is locally asymptotically
stable (las) and attracts all interior trajectories. Similarly, “gas restricted to a face” means
“las restricted to this face and attracts all interior trajectories on this face”.
14
whose endpoints are the carrying capacities −ri/aii of the logistic equation315
for each species i on its own.316
By Theorem 1 and Remark 1, (10) has no interior equilibria. Moreover,317
E1 ≡ (ρ∗1, ρ∗2, 0) corresponds to a saddle point on the x1x2 edge whose stable318
manifold is this edge and E2 ≡ (0, ρ̂2, µ̂1) corresponds to a stable equilibrium319
on the x2x3 edge of the triangle. Thus, of the 33 possible classes of dynamic320
behavior classified by Zeeman (1993), the dynamics on the triangle is given321
by one of classes 9 to 12 depending on the behavior on the x1x3 edge. In all322
four classes, the equilibrium corresponding to E2 is globally asymptotically323
stable. 324
Evolutionary substitution also occurs when the mutant phenotype “dom-325
inates” the resident phenotype it substitutes for according to the following326
theorem. Here, dominance is used in the game-theoretic sense in that the327
expected payoff (or fitness) of an individual using the mutant phenotype is328
greater than that of the resident phenotype (i.e. the mutant is more fit)329
whenever some phenotypes are present (see (11) below).330
Theorem 3 As in Theorem 1, let E1 ≡ (ρ∗, 0) and E2 ≡ (0, ρ̂2, ..., ρ̂N , µ̂1)331
be equilibria of the N-species resident-mutant LV system (3) with all species332
present (i.e. ρ∗i > 0 for i = 1, 2, ..., N and ρ̂j > 0 for j = 2, ..., N and333
µ̂1 > 0). Furthermore, assume that all forward trajectories of (3) are bound-334
ed12 and that E2 is globally asymptotically stable equilibrium for system (3)335
restricted to its N−dimensional boundary face. If the mutant phenotype is336
always more fit than the resident phenotype of species one, then there is no337
interior equilibrium, the resident phenotype of species one goes extinct and338
E2 is a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium for system (3). Moreover,339
if no interior trajectories converge to the boundary of the N−dimensional340
boundary face containing E2, then evolutionary substitution occurs.341
Proof. Since the mutant phenotype is always more fit than the resident342
phenotype of species one343
r1 +
N∑
l=1
mIR1l ρl +m
II
11µ1 > r1 +
N∑
l=1
mRR1l ρl +m
RI
11 µ1 (11)
12That is, each trajectory is defined for all t ≥ 0 and all its components are less that D
for some D > 0 that may depend on the trajectory.
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for all (ρ1, ρ2, ..., ρN , µ1) with nonnegative components and at least one com-344
ponent positive. In particular, this inequality holds at E1 and E2 (i.e. λ
I
1 > 0345
and λR1 < 0). Since λ
R
1 < 0 and E2 is globally asymptotically stable equilib-346
rium for system (3) restricted to its N−dimensional boundary face, E2 is a347
locally asymptotically stable equilibrium for system (3).348
The resident phenotype of species one goes extinct if every interior tra-349
jectory of (3) converges to the N−dimensional boundary face with ρ1 = 0.350
Actually, this convergence holds for every trajectory with ρ1 and µ1 initially351
both positive. To see this, consider a given trajectory with ρ1 and µ1 initial-352
ly positive. The first and the last equation of system (3) yield that d
dt
(
ρ1
µ1
)
353
equals354
ρ1µ1
(
r1 +
∑N
l=1m
RR
1l ρl +m
RI
11 µ1
)
− ρ1µ1
(
r1 +
∑N
l=1m
IR
1l ρl +m
II
11µ1
)
µ21
= −ρ1
µ1
((
r1 +
N∑
l=1
mIR1l ρl +m
II
11µ1
)− (r1 + N∑
l=1
mRR1l ρl +m
RI
11 µ1
))
< 0
for all (ρ1, ρ2, ..., ρN , µ1) where ρ1 and µ1 are both positive. The final in-355
equality follows from (11). Thus, ρ1
µ1
is a strictly decreasing function a-356
long every trajectory where ρ1 and µ1 are initially both positive. For the357
given interior trajectory, define limt→∞
ρ1(t)
µ1(t)
= C ≥ 0. If C = 0, then358
limt→∞ ρ1(t) = 0 since µ1(t) is bounded. Suppose that ρ1 does not converge359
to 0 (i.e. lim supt→∞ ρ1(t) > 0). Thus, C > 0 and there exists a limit point360
of the given trajectory with ρ1 and µ1 both positive. Any trajectory that361
is initially at this limit point is also in the limit set of the given trajectory.362
Since ρ1
µ1
is a strictly decreasing at this initial point, limt→∞
ρ1(t)
µ1(t)
< C, a363
contradiction. Since the resident phenotype ρ1 goes extinct, there can be no364
interior equilibrium.365
As a by-product of the previous considerations, we see that interior trajec-366
tories converge to nonempty compact subsets of the N−dimensional bound-367
ary face ρ1 = 0 of the non-negative (N+1)−dimensional orthant. This is the368
boundary face that contains equilibrium E2. By the last assumption of the369
theorem, interior trajectories have a limit point with the properties ρ1 = 0370
and ρ2ρ3 . . . ρNµ1 > 0. Since E2 is globally asymptotically stable for system371
(3) restricted to the face ρ1 = 0 and locally asymptotically stable for the full372
resident-intruder system (3) on RN+1≥0 , E2 is the only limit point of any given373
interior trajectory. That is, interior trajectories converge to E2. In other374
16
words, evolutionary substitution occurs. 375
Remark 2. The condition in Theorem 3 that E2 is globally asymptotical-376
ly stable equilibria for system (3) restricted to its N−dimensional boundary377
face is necessary for the conclusion that evolutionary substitution occurs. To378
see this, consider Example 1 again. In it, we have that the mutant fitness379
−4 + 7ρ2 − 3µ1 is always greater than the fitness −4 − 3ρ1 + 7ρ2 − 4µ1 of380
the resident phenotype of species one when ρ1 and µ1 are positive. However,381
evolutionary substitution does not occur in Example 1 since (0, 0, 0) is local-382
ly asymptotically stable. Note that Theorem 3 also makes the biologically383
reasonable assumption that the density of each species must be bounded.384
4 Evolutionary Replacement385
In this section, we assume that the N−species system has one resident phe-386
notype and one mutant phenotype in each species. Then the resident-mutant387
Lotka-Volterra system is388
ρ˙k = ρk
(
rk +
N∑
l=1
(
mRRkl ρl +m
RI
kl µl
))
(12)
µ˙k = µk
(
rk +
N∑
l=1
(
mIRkl ρl +m
II
klµl
))
where M II ,MRI ,M IR,MRR are now all N ×N interaction matrices.389
The first requirement of evolutionary replacement is that the invasion390
criteria for system (12) be satisfied. That is, the N−dimensional resident391
system has a locally asymptotically stable interior equilibrium E1 ≡ (ρ∗, 0)392
(where ρ∗i > 0 for i = 1, 2, ..., N) that can be invaded by the mutant pheno-393
types and the N−dimensional mutant system has a locally asymptotically394
stable interior equilibrium E2 ≡ (0, µ∗) (where µ∗i > 0 for i = 1, 2, ..., N) that395
cannot be invaded by the resident phenotypes. The following example shows396
that these invasion conditions do not rule out the existence of a stable interior397
equilibrium of the resident-mutant system. Thus, the obvious generalization398
of Theorem 1 is not valid for evolutionary replacement.399
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We then examine extensions of the domination concept of Theorem 3 to400
replacement systems. In this section, we concentrate on examples with two401
species (i.e. N = 2) since Example 1 shows that care must already be taken402
when there are two species and a single mutant phenotype.403
Example 2 Consider the resident-mutant system404
ρ˙1 = ρ1(2− ρ1 − µ1)
ρ˙2 = ρ2(3− ρ2 − 2µ1)
µ˙1 = µ1(2− 2ρ1 + ρ2 − µ1)
µ˙2 = µ2(3− 3ρ1 + ρ2 − µ2).
The intrinsic growth rates of species one and two are r1 = 2 and r2 = 3405
respectively. This has an interior equilibrium at (ρ1, ρ2, µ1, µ2) = (1, 1, 1, 1)406
that is locally asymptotically stable since the only eigenvalue of the corre-407
sponding 4 × 4 Jacobian matrix is −1 (with multiplicity 4). The resident408
system has a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium at (ρ∗1, ρ
∗
2) = (2, 3)409
and the mutant system also has a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium410
at (µ∗1, µ
∗
2) = (2, 3). Moreover, to analyze whether (ρ
∗
1, ρ
∗
2) can be invaded, we411
calculate λI1 = 2− 2ρ∗1 + ρ∗2 = 1 > 0 and λI2 = 3− 3ρ∗1 + ρ∗2 = 0. Similarly, to412
analyze whether (µ∗1, µ
∗
1) can be invaded, we calculate λ
R
1 = 2 − µ∗1 = 0 and413
λR2 = 3− 2µ∗1 = −1 < 0.414
Since the eigenvalue λI2 is zero (respectively, λ
R
1 = 0), it is not imme-415
diately clear whether (ρ∗1, ρ
∗
2, 0, 0) = (2, 3, 0, 0) (respectively, (0, 0, µ
∗
1, µ
∗
2) =416
(0, 0, 2, 3)) can be invaded. To avoid the use of B-matrix methods for these417
neutral invasion coefficients (Cressman and Garay, 2003a), we consider in-418
stead the slightly perturbed system419
ρ˙1 = ρ1(2− ρ1 − (1 + ε)µ1)
ρ˙2 = ρ2(3− ρ2 − 2µ1) (13)
µ˙1 = µ1(2− 2ρ1 + ρ2 − µ1)
µ˙2 = µ2(3− 3ρ1 + (1 + ε)ρ2 − µ2)
with some ε > 0. The new interior equilibrium
(
1−5ε
1−2ε ,
1−6ε
1−2ε ,
1
1−2ε ,
1+4ε−6ε2
1−2ε
)
420
will still be locally asymptotically stable when ε is sufficiently small. More-421
over, the equilibrium of the resident system remains unchanged at (ρ∗1, ρ
∗
2, 0, 0) =422
(2, 3, 0, 0) as does the equilibrium for the mutant system (0, 0, µ∗1, µ
∗
2) = (0, 0, 2, 3).423
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However, it is now clear that both invader phenotypes can invade (ρ∗1, ρ
∗
2, 0, 0),424
since λI1 = 2−2ρ∗1+ρ∗2 = 1 > 0 and λI2 = 3−3ρ∗1+(1+ε)ρ∗2 = 3ε > 0. Also, at425
(0, 0, µ∗1, µ
∗
2), neither resident phenotype can invade since λ
R
1 = 2−(1+ε)µ∗1 =426
−2ε < 0 and λR2 = 3− 2µ∗1 = −1 < 0.427
By Example 2, it is clear that more conditions are needed besides our inva-428
sion criteria in order to guarantee evolutionary replacement. One possibility429
is to assume that the mutant phenotype “dominates” the resident phenotype430
in each species as in Theorem 3 (i.e. the mutant phenotype is always more431
fit than the resident phenotype in each species). Keeping the boundedness432
assumption on forward trajectories, we see that all interior trajectories of433
the 2N−dimensional resident-mutant system converge to nonempty compact434
subsets of the N−dimensional mutant system. In particular, there are no in-435
terior equilibria. Moreover, the proof of Theorem 3 easily extends to show436
that there will be evolutionary replacement when the N−dimensional mutant437
system has a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium (µ∗1, µ
∗
2, ..., µ
∗
N) with438
all species present if interior trajectories do not converge to the boundary of439
the N−dimensional mutant system.13440
The dominance concept discussed in the previous paragraph is very strong.441
A weaker form of dominance borrowed from game theory (Hofbauer and442
Sigmund, 1998) is that some weighted average of the mutant phenotypes443
is always more fit than some weighted average of the resident phenotypes.444
This also guarantees there is no interior equilibrium of the resident-mutant445
system.14446
Unfortunately, the following example based on Akin and Hofbauer (1982)447
shows this dominance does not guarantee interior trajectories converge to the448
13Specifically, by the dominance assumption, ρi/µi for i = 1, 2, ..., N are all strictly
decreasing when ρi and µi are initially positive. Since all forward trajectories are bounded,
the proof of Theorem 3 shows that limt→∞ ρi(t) = 0 for all i (i.e. all resident phenotypes
go extinct). Moreover, since no interior trajectories converge to the boundary of the
N−dimensional mutant system, each such trajectory has a limit point in the interior of
the N−dimensional mutant face. Global asymptotic stability of (µ∗1, µ∗2, ..., µ∗N ) on this face
combined with its local asymptotic stability in the full resident-mutant system guarantees
that it is the only limit point of each interior trajectory.
14To see this, consider
(
N∏
i=1
ρwii
)
/
(
N∏
i=1
µvii
)
where wi > 0 are the weights for the
residents and vi > 0 are the weights for the mutants. These weights satisfy
∑
wi = 1 =∑
vi. In view of (12), this expression is strictly decreasing at all interior points and so
there is no interior equilibrium.
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N−dimensional mutant system.449
Example 3 Consider the two-species resident-mutant competitive system450
ρ˙1 = ρ1(1− 2ρ1 − 5ρ2 − µ1 − 5µ2)
ρ˙2 = ρ2(1− 5ρ1 − 2ρ2 − 5µ1 − µ2) (14)
µ˙1 = µ1(1− 3ρ1 − ρ2 − 2µ1 − 3µ2)
µ˙2 = µ2(1− ρ1 − 3ρ2 − 3µ1 − 2µ2).
There is no interior equilibrium since the average fitness of the mutants dom-
inates the average of the residents (i.e. 1−2ρ1−2ρ2− 52µ1− 52µ2 > 1− 72ρ1−
7
2
ρ2−3µ1−3µ2). Since the intrinsic growth rates for both species are the same,
the frequencies xi of the four phenotypes
(
e.g. x1 = ρ1/(ρ1 + ρ2 + µ1 + µ2)
)
evolve according to the replicator equation with payoff matrix
A =

−2 −5 −1 −5
−5 −2 −5 −1
−3 −1 −2 −3
−1 −3 −3 −2

given by the interaction coefficients (Hofbauer and Sigmund, Exercise 7.5.2,
1998). If each entry of A is increased by 2 (which does not change the
replicator equation) and the variables in (14) are reordered by interchanging
ρ1 with µ2, the payoff matrix becomes
A′ =

0 −1 −1 1
1 0 −3 −3
−1 1 0 −1
−3 −3 1 0

which is the example analyzed by Akin and Hofbauer (1982). They prove that451
all interior trajectories approach a heteroclinic cycle that follows the edges of452
the three-dimensional strategy simplex (i.e. the tetrahedron) in the order of453
vertices ρ1 → µ2 → ρ2 → µ1 → ρ1. In particular, the resident phenotypes do454
not go extinct even though ρ1ρ2
µ1µ2
evolves to 0.455
In Example 3, notice that the equilibrium of the resident system (1/7, 1/7)456
for (14) can be invaded by both mutant phenotypes since λI1 = λ
I
2 = 1−3/7−457
1/7 > 0 whereas the equilibrium of the mutant system (1/5, 1/5) cannot be458
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invaded by either resident phenotype since λR1 = λ
R
2 = 1 − 2/5 − 5/5 < 0.459
On the other hand, these equilibria are unstable in their respective two-460
dimensional system since the determinant of the linearization is negative in461
both cases. This leaves open the possibility that combining dominance with462
conditions that these boundary equilibria are locally asymptotically stable463
in their respective two-dimensional system implies evolutionary replacement.464
As we will see in the following section, this is indeed the case for two-species465
competitive systems in biologically significant scenarios where dominance466
must occur.467
Remark 3. Before leaving this section, notice that the time-reversed
dynamics for the replicator equation of Example 3 given by the payoff matrix
−A provides an excellent illustration of evolutionary replacement. Indeed,
since the average payoff of the first two strategies dominates the average
payoff of the last two strategies, we also reverse the order of the four strategies
and analyze the payoff matrix
A′′ =

−8 −7 −7 −9
−7 −8 −9 −7
−9 −5 −8 −5
−5 −9 −5 −8

formed by subtracting 10 from each entry of −A with reordered strategies.468
The analysis of Akin and Hofbauer (1982) shows that the equilibrium of469
the replicator equation corresponding to (0, 0, 1/13, 1/13) (i.e. the frequency470
vector (0, 0, 1/2, 1/2)) is globally asymptotically stable.471
For the resident-mutant competitive system corresponding to A′′,472
ρ˙1 = ρ1(1− 8ρ1 − 7ρ2 − 7µ1 − 9µ2)
ρ˙2 = ρ2(1− 7ρ1 − 8ρ2 − 9µ1 − 7µ2) (15)
µ˙1 = µ1(1− 9ρ1 − 5ρ2 − 8µ1 − 5µ2)
µ˙2 = µ2(1− 5ρ1 − 9ρ2 − 5µ1 − 8µ2)
the residents have equilibrium 1
15
(1, 1) which is globally asymptotically stable473
on this face and invadable by the mutants since λI1,2 = 1−(9+5)/15 > 0. The474
mutants have equilibrium 1
13
(1, 1) (which is globally asymptotically stable on475
this face) and this is not invadable since λR1,2 = 1− (7 + 9)/13 < 0.476
The mutant phenotypes invade the resident system but the residents can-477
not invade the mutants. Furthermore, all interior trajectories of (15) that478
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start close to the resident equilibrium evolve to the equilibrium of the mutant479
system. That is, the mutant phenotypes have replaced the residents.480
4.1 Historically independent replacement481
As mentioned in the Introduction (see also Section 5), if the successful inva-482
sions occur through a sequence of evolutionary substitutions that does not483
depend on whether a rare mutant first appears in species one or in species484
two, then evolutionary replacement ensues. This is shown for two-species485
competitive LV systems in Theorem 4 below.486
For two-species competitive LV systems, the invasion conditions com-487
pletely characterize evolutionary substitution by Section 3. Since we are not488
concerned about the order that mutants appear for historically independent489
replacement, we assume that the stable two-dimensional systems consisting490
of one phenotype from each species satisfy491
(i) ρ1ρ2 can be invaded by both µ1 and µ2
(ii) µ1ρ2 can be invaded by µ2 but not by ρ1 (16)
(iii) ρ1µ2 can be invaded by µ1 but not by ρ2
(iv) µ1µ2 cannot be invaded by ρ1 or by ρ2.
By Theorem 2, each subsystem consisting of three phenotypes has a globally492
asymptotically stable equilibrium where exactly one of the resident pheno-493
types goes extinct.494
The sequence of evolutionary substitutions given by rare mutations can495
then serve as a model of punctuated equilibrium based on the fossil record496
in paleontology, a concept suggested by Eldredge and Gould (1972). This497
theory claims that during a short geological time, new species arrive in rapid498
succession and contribute revolutionary morphological changes. Following499
these speciation events, an evolutionary stable ecosystem rapidly evolves,500
where lineages are in stasis. We have previously demonstrated that, in a501
two-species coevolutionary model, successful invasion is quickly followed by502
evolutionary changes in behavior, leading to a sequence of punctuated equi-503
librium (Cressman and Garay 2006). Historically independent replacement504
implies that the final outcome for the ecosystem can be predicted without505
knowing the sequence of mutations and their intermediate stasis events.506
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Theorem 4 Suppose a two-species competitive system exhibits historically507
independent replacement. In other words, the four two-dimensional faces508
ρ1ρ2, ρ2µ1, ρ1µ2 and µ1µ2 have globally asymptotically stable interior equi-509
libria that satisfy (16). Then there is no interior equilibrium where mutants510
and residents coexist. Moreover, the equilibrium (0, 0, µ∗1, µ
∗
2) with both mu-511
tants present is globally asymptotically stable for the resident-mutant system512
(12) with N = 2. That is, evolutionary replacement occurs.513
Proof. The general two-species competitive resident-mutant system has514
the form515
ρ˙1 = ρ1(r1 − a11ρ1 − a12ρ2 − a13µ1 − a14µ2)
ρ˙2 = ρ2(r2 − a21ρ1 − a22ρ2 − a23µ1 − a24µ2) (17)
µ˙1 = µ1(r1 − a31ρ1 − a32ρ2 − a33µ1 − a34µ2)
µ˙2 = µ2(r2 − a41ρ1 − a42ρ2 − a43µ1 − a44µ2)
where r1 > 0, r2 > 0 and aij > 0 for all i, j correspond to the entries of the516
interaction matrix −A. Consider the associated system517
ρ˙1 = ρ1
(
1− a11
r1
ρ1 − a12
r1
ρ2 − a13
r1
µ1 − a14
r1
µ2
)
ρ˙2 = ρ2
(
1− a21
r2
ρ1 − a22
r2
ρ2 − a23
r2
µ1 − a24
r2
µ2
)
(18)
µ˙1 = µ1
(
1− a31
r1
ρ1 − a32
r1
ρ2 − a33
r1
µ1 − a34
r1
µ2
)
µ˙2 = µ2
(
1− a41
r2
ρ1 − a42
r2
ρ2 − a43
r2
µ1 − a44
r2
µ2
)
.
This is also a competitive system where the interaction matrix −Â is given
by
âij =
{ aij
ri
if i = 1, 2
aij
ri−2
if i = 3, 4
.
System (18) has the same interior equilibria as well as the same equilibria on518
each boundary face as the original system (17).519
In general, the stability of the same equilibrium for systems (17) and520
(18) can be different. However, for each equilibrium on a two-dimensional521
boundary face, their stability properties for both systems are the same. For522
example, (0, 0, µ∗1, µ
∗
2) is an equilibrium in the interior of the mutant system523
23
(17) if and only if it is for system (18). Also, (0, 0, µ∗1, µ
∗
2) is locally asymp-524
totically stable on its two-dimensional face for system (17) if and only if the525
determinant a33a44 − a34a43 of
[ −a33 −a34
−a43 −a44
]
is positive if and only if the526
determinant of
[ −a33
r1
−a34
r1−a43
r2
−a44
r2
]
is positive if and only if (0, 0, µ∗1, µ
∗
2) is locally527
asymptotically stable on its two-dimensional face for system (18). Finally,528
(0, 0, µ∗1, µ
∗
2) can by invaded by the resident phenotype of species 1 for system529
(17) if and only if r1−a13µ∗1−a14µ∗2 > 0 if and only if 1− a13r1 µ∗1− a14r1 µ∗2 > 0 if530
and only if (0, 0, µ∗1, µ
∗
2) can by invaded by the resident phenotype of species531
1 for system (18).532
By Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998, Exercise 7.5.2), the dynamics of system533
(18) is the “same” as the replicator equation on the three-dimensional strat-534
egy simplex ∆4 ≡ {(x1, x2, x3, x4) | xi ≥ 0,
∑
xi = 1} with payoff matrix535
−Â. Moreover, this replicator equation is also given by a payoff matrix of536
the form B where537
B ≡

0 b12 b13 b14
b21 0 b23 b24
b31 b32 0 b34
b41 b42 b43 0
 (19)
by subtracting the diagonal entry of −Â from all entries in its column. We538
want to show the assumptions that the four two-dimensional faces ρ1ρ2, ρ2µ1,539
ρ1µ2 and µ1µ2 have globally asymptotically stable interior equilibria that540
satisfy (16) imply that this matrix game has no equilibrium in the interior541
of ∆4.542
First, globally asymptotic stability of interior equilibria on the four two-543
dimensional faces implies that b12, b14, b21, b23, b32, b34, b41, b43 are all positive.544
The other entries in B, indicated by boldface in (19), may be positive or nega-545
tive. The invasion assumptions correspond to the following eight inequalities546
in (20). For instance, the interior resident equilibrium for the replicator e-547
quation is (ρ∗1, ρ
∗
2) =
(
b12
b12+b21
, b21
b12+b21
)
. This is invadable by mutant strategy548
of species 1 if b31ρ
∗
1+b32ρ
∗
2−ρ∗1b12ρ∗2−ρ∗2b21ρ∗1 > 0, which is the first inequality549
24
listed
(
i.e. b31b12 + b32b21 > b12b21
)
.550
(a) b31b12 + b32b21 > b12b21
(b) b41b12 + b42b21 > b12b21
(c) b12b23 + b13b32 < b23b32 ⇒ (c0) b23 > b13
(d) b42b23 + b43b32 > b23b32 (20)
(e) b21b14 + b24b41 < b14b41 ⇒ (e0) b14 > b24
(f) b31b14 + b34b41 > b14b41
(g) b13b34 + b14b43 < b34b43 ⇒ (g0) b43 > b13
(h) b23b34 + b24b43 < b34b43 ⇒ (h0) b34 > b24
By Akin (1980), there is no equilibrium in the interior of ∆4 if and only if551
there is some dominance relation among the four strategies. In fact, we show552
in Appendix A3 that a convex combination of the two mutant strategies553
dominates a convex combination of the two resident strategies. That is,554
for matrix B, we show dominance of the form y(row1) + (1 − y)(row2) <555
x(row3) + (1− x)(row4) for some x, y ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the replicator equation556
has no interior equilibrium and so neither does (17).557
Given an interior trajectory of (17), the dominance in matrix B means558
that
ρ
x/r1
1 ρ
(1−x)/r2
2
µ
y/r1
1 µ
(1−y)/r2
2
is strictly decreasing. Moreover, since the trajectory con-559
verges to the carrying simplex of the competitive system (and so is bounded560
as well as bounded away from the origin), the method of proof of Theorem 3561
generalizes to show that limt→∞ ρ1ρ2 = 0. Thus, there can be no limit point562
in the interior of a three-dimensional face since this face must include the563
µ1µ2 plane in which case the only limit point is (0, 0, µ
∗
1, µ
∗
2). That is, if the564
trajectory does not converge to (0, 0, µ∗1, µ
∗
2), then all its limit points must be565
in the four curves of the carrying simplex contained in the ρ1µ1, ρ1µ2, ρ2µ1,566
ρ2µ2 planes. The trajectory cannot converge to an equilibrium point on any567
of these four curves since all such points have an unstable manifold of at568
least one-dimension. That is, either the trajectory converges to (0, 0, µ∗1, µ
∗
2)569
or else to a heteroclinic cycle around these four curves (in analogy to Exam-570
ple 3). This latter scenario is impossible due to the locally asymptotically571
stable equilibrium for the curve in the ρ1µ2 plane (or the ρ2µ1 plane). In572
summary, every interior trajectory converges to (0, 0, µ∗1, µ
∗
2), which is then573
globally asymptotically stable. 574
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5 Conclusion575
Our motivation is rooted in evolutionary game theory. Specifically, the ap-576
proach we adopt has parallels with invasion and stability concepts used in577
frequency-dependent selection theory modelled by evolutionary game theory.578
There, the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) was introduced579
by Maynard Smith and Price (1973) as a population state that cannot be in-580
vaded by any mutant strategy that is sufficiently rare. Later, Apaloo (1997)581
defined a neighborhood invader strategy (NIS) as a strategy that can success-582
fully invade all nearby strategies. The combination of these two concepts for583
matrix games yields an ESNIS (Apaloo, 2006) that exhibits the frequency-584
dependent version of evolutionary substitution. On the other hand, evolution585
works on the ecological system too, where the interactions are also density-586
dependent. As we saw in Section 2, ecological stability together with the587
mutant phenotype being an ESNIS is equivalent to evolutionary substitution588
for single-species LV systems (that also includes population density effects).589
This answers one of the questions posed by Garay (2007) (i.e. what kind of590
mutant is able to substitute for or replace the resident clone) who was also591
interested in circumstances when stable coexistence of resident and mutant592
phenotypes arises. In the present paper, we extend these concepts of sub-593
stitution and replacement to N−species LV systems, relying as well on the594
notion of evolutionary stability introduced earlier for these systems (Garay595
and Varga, 2000; Cressman and Garay, 2003a). From this perspective, the596
paper can be viewed as extending the theory of ecological and evolutionary597
stability to N−species LV systems.598
Simultaneous invasion by two species occurs naturally as the following599
example shows. When an invasive species appears, it is usually introduced600
at a low density. An important question is whether the invasive species can or601
cannot substitute for the native species. For instance, Grey squirrels (Sciurus602
carolinensis) originated in North America and are a vector for a smallpox603
virus that evolved there. Grey squirrels (and this virus) have been introduced604
in many places throughout the world (e.g. England and continental Europe)605
where they do not need large numbers to start a new population. In Great606
Britain, grey squirrels have been able to spread 17-25 times faster through607
competitive exclusion (Bertolino et al. 2008) of the red squirrel (Sciurus608
vulgaris) due to increased mortality of reds from the squirrelpox virus which609
was not resident in Europe (Sandro, 2008; Strauss, 2012). Grey squirrels do610
not die from this virus but the virus can spread from them and infect red611
26
squirrels, causing death. Clearly, in this case, two species (i.e. grey squirrels612
and its virus) simultaneously invade into the European ecosystems, and the613
interactions in the whole ecosystem determine the success of grey squirrels.614
In the evolutionary process, past historical events play a crucial role in ex-615
plaining structural and functional features (Herrera 1992) in the ecosystem.616
For instance, nectarivory and pollination by birds is common in southern617
Australia, while in Europe social bees play these roles (Ford 1985). However,618
ecosytem convergence has been considered by ecologists as evidence not only619
in the present (Ojeda et al 2001) but also between the Pleistocene period620
and the present (Cowling at al. 1994, 1999). This means that under similar621
conditions (e.g. climate, soils), similar ecosystems evolve. Since mutation622
is a random process, the histories of evolution of these ecosystems are dif-623
ferent but the outcome is similar as would be expected if it is independent624
of the order mutations occur. For such biological systems, we feel that the625
concept of historically independent replacement introduced in Section 4.1 is626
important.627
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Appendix A1. Remark 1714
Proof of formula (6) in Remark 1. Here, we prove that
|A|:x∗1 = −
∣∣A1∣∣ (r1 + (Ax1)1)
when N = 2 and A1 =
[
a22 a23
a32 a33
]
is nonsingular. The general proof of (6)715
is a straightforward extension of the methods provided here.716
Since A1 is nonsingular, (Ax1)1 = a12x
1
2 + a13x
1
3 where x
1 =
 0x12
x13
 has
components given by the solution of
[
a22 a23
a32 a33
] [
x12
x13
]
+
[
r2
r3
]
=
[
0
0
]
.
By Cramer’s Rule,
x12 = −
1
|A1|
∣∣∣∣ r2 a23r3 a33
∣∣∣∣ and x13 = − 1|A1|
∣∣∣∣ a22 r2a32 r3
∣∣∣∣
and so∣∣A1∣∣ (r1 + (Ax1)1) = r1 ∣∣∣∣ a22 a23a32 a33
∣∣∣∣− a12 ∣∣∣∣ r2 a23r3 a33
∣∣∣∣− a13 ∣∣∣∣ a22 r2a32 r3
∣∣∣∣ .
30
Set W1 =
 r1 a12 a13r2 a22 a23
r3 a32 a33
. Expanding |W1| along the first row, we obtain
|W1| = r1
∣∣∣∣ a22 a23a32 a33
∣∣∣∣− a12 ∣∣∣∣ r2 a23r3 a33
∣∣∣∣+ a13 ∣∣∣∣ r2 a22r3 a32
∣∣∣∣ .
In particular, |W1| = |A1| (r1 + (Ax1)1).717
Since x∗ is a solution of Ax + r = 0 for N = 2, a simple rearrangement
gives W1
 1x∗2
x∗3
 = −x∗1
 a11a21
a31
. The first coordinate of vector
 1x∗2
x∗3
 can
be expressed as
1 = −:x
∗
1|A|
|W1| whenever :|W1| 6= 0:.
In other words, condition |W1| 6= 0 implies formula (6) for i = 1 and N = 2.718
If |W1| = 0, there are two cases depending on the (non)singularity of A. If A719
is nonsingular, then Cramer’s Rule applies to Ax∗ = −r and yields x∗1 = 0.720
By using |W1| = |A1| (r1 + (Ax1)1) again, the nonsingularity of A1 implies721
the x∗1 = 0 = (r1 + (Ax
1)1) special case of (6). In the second case where A722
is singular, then |A| = 0 and, as before, (r1 + (Ax1)1) = 0 and we are done.723
724
Appendix A2. Example 1725
Discussion of Example 1 (continued). To describe the global phase portrait726
of the three-dimensional (3D) LV system (7) investigated in Example 1, we727
pass to the associated 4D replicator system15 (Bomze, 1983; Hofbauer and728
Sigmund, 1998)729
x˙i = xi
(
(Ax)i − x ·Ax
)
where A =

0 5 −1 −4
2 0 2 −1
3 5 0 −4
3 −2 3 0
 (21)
15We use Bomze’s normalization of choosing a11 = a22 = a33 = a44 = 0
31
is the payoff matrix, x · Ax is the dot product Σixi(Ax)i of the column730
vectors x and Ax, and731
x1 =
ρ1
κ
, x2 =
ρ2
κ
, x3 =
µ1
κ
, x4 =
1
κ
(22)
with κ = ρ1 + ρ2 + µ1 + 1. When doing this, the non-negative octant
(ρ1, ρ2, µ1) ∈ R3≥0 is replaced by the three-dimensional unit simplex
∆4 = {(x1, x2, x3, x4)T ∈ R4≥0 | x1, x2, x3, x4 ≥ 0 and x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 = 1}
with barycentric coordinates. Clearly the vertices of ∆4 (i.e., V1 = e1, V2 =
e2, V3 = e3, V4 = e4) are equilibria of the 4D replicator system in (21). Three
nontrivial equilibria are lying on 1D edges, namely
S =
1
3
(
e2 + 2e4
)
, Q− =
1
7
(
5e1 + 2e2
)
, Q+ =
1
7
(
2e2 + 5e3
)
and two more equilibria are lying on 2D faces, namely
P− =
1
3
(
e1 + e2 + e4
)
, P+ =
1
3
(
e2 + e3 + e4
)
:.
It is an easy but somewhat lengthy task to apply the standard Grobman-
Hartman lemma in the vicinity of each equilibrium. The Jacobian is com-
puted by the general formula
Jij = δi,j
(
(Ax)i − x ·Ax
)
: + :xi
(
aij − (Ax)j − aj · x
)
:, i, j = 1, 2, 3, 4 :
where aj is the jth column of A. Eigenvectors which are not perpendicular732
to the normal vector of the 3D plane of equation x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 = 1 have733
to be disregarded. Our final result is demonstrated in Figure 2.734
In order to illustrate the behavior of the resident-mutant system (7) far
from the origin of R3≥0, triangle V1V2V3 is replaced by the front-right-top
octant of a sphere. A quick analysis of (22) implies that the properties
observed in the last paragraph of Example 1 are lifted to the level of the
associated replicator subsystems. In particular, the x3 = 0 and the x1 = 0
restrictions of the full replicator system (21)—shown as the ‘circular sectors’
V1V4V2 and V3V4V2 in Figure 2—are dynamically the same and of Type 12
in Bomze’s classification of 2D replicator systems (see Bomze, 1983; Bomze,
32
Figure 2: Schematic phase portrait of the replicator system (21).
1995); cf. with Figure 7.1 in Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) and Figure 37
(a) in Maynard Smith (1982). The rest follows from inequalities
d
dt
(
x3
x1
)
=
x3
x1
(3x1 + x3) > 0 and
d
dt
(
µ1
ρ1
)
=
µ1
ρ1
(3ρ1 + µ1) > 0,
valid for trajectories of systems (21) and (7) with x1, x3 ∈ (0, 1) and ρ1, µ1 >735
0, respectively.16736
16The local phase portraits in the vicinity of the nine equilibria are clearly visible in
Figure 2. Note that V1 is a repellor, V4 and P+ are attractors. All the other equilibria are
saddles. Equilibria V2 and V3 have a unique ingoing trajectory each. Equilibria P− and Q+
have a unique outgoing trajectory each. Equilibria S and Q− have two outgoing and two
ingoing trajectories, respectively. On the 2D faces containing P− and P+, both P− and P+
are stable foci created by the complex eigenvalue pair −1±i
√
3
6 . The unstable eigendirection
at P− is (−11,−2, 13, 0)T with eigenvalue λ4 = 1. The strongly-stable eigendirection
33
Appendix A3. Theorem 4737
Proof of Theorem 4 (continued). It is left to point out that a convex combi-738
nation of the two mutant strategies dominates a convex combination of the739
two resident strategies.740
741
Given a 4× 4 matrix B in (19) whose entries are subject to conditions
bii = 0 whenever i = 1, 2, 3, 4 and bij > 0 whenever i+j = 2k+1, k = 1, 2, 3
and to the conditions listed in (20), we look for dominance of the form742
y(row1) + (1− y)(row2) < x(row3) + (1− x)(row4) (23)
with some x = x∗ ∈ [0, 1] and y = y∗ ∈ [0, 1] suitably chosen.743
Each column of matrix B—more precisely, each coordinate vector of the744
row vectors in (23)—leads to a linear, strict inequality in the xy−plane. All745
in all, we are facing four open half-planes defined by the linear inequalities746
y > `1(x) = 1− xb31 + (1− x)b41
b21
, y < `2(x) =
xb32 + (1− x)b42
b12
,
y > `3(x) =
b23 − (1− x)b43
b23 − b13 , y < `4(x) =
xb34 − b24
b14 − b24 , (24)
respectively. The line of equation y = `i(x) will be denoted by Li, i =747
1, 2, 3, 4. Please note that all denominators are positive
(
for i = 3 and i = 4,748
recall that b23 > b13 by (20c0) and b14 > b24 by (20e0)
)
. As a by-product,749
both L3 and L4 have positive slopes.750
751
Our aim is to construct a solution pair x = x∗ ∈ [0, 1] and y = y∗ ∈ [0, 1]752
to the linear system of inequalities (24). Depending on the properties of the753
lines L1, L2, L3, L4, a lengthy separation of cases will be required. But first754
at P+ is (3, 2,−13, 8)T with λ1 = − 13 . The center-unstable and the strongly-unstable
eigendirections at Q− are (−85, 8, 0, 77)T with λ3 = 17 and (−31,−4, 35, 0)T with λ4 = 157 ,
respectively. The center-stable and the unstable eigendirections at Q+ are (−7, 4, 3, 0)T
with λ3 = − 57 and (0, 8,−85, 77)T with λ4 = 17 , respectively. The 2D stable quadrant at
S is the convex span of eigendirections (0, 1,−9, 8)T and (−9, 1, 0, 8)T belonging to the
double eigenvalue λ1,2 = − 13 . Finally, let us note that all α-limit sets and all ω-limit sets
of (21) are one of the nine equilibria.
34
we collect some inequalities which are valid for all cases to be investigated.755
756
Note that L2 is always strictly above L1 for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 since
(
0, 1 − b41
b21
)
757
and
(
1, 1− b31
b21
)
are points on L1,
(
0, b42
b12
)
and
(
1, b32
b12
)
are points on L2 and758
1 − b41
b21
< b42
b12
by (20b) and 1 − b31
b21
< b32
b12
by (20a). Similarly, note that L3759
is strictly to the right of L4 for 0 ≤ y ≤ 1 since
(
1− b23
b43
, 0
)
and
(
1− b13
b43
, 1
)
760
are points on L3,
(
b24
b34
, 0
)
and
(
b14
b34
, 1
)
are points on L4, and 1− b23b43 > b24b34 by761
(20h) and 1− b13
b43
> b14
b34
by (20g). A major consequence is that geometrically,762
our task is to find a point (x∗, y∗) in the unit square [0, 1]2 that is (strictly)763
above L1, below L2, to the left of L3, and to the right of L4.764
Set y0i = `i(0) and y1i = `i(1), i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Let x0i be the x−coordinate765
of Li at y = 0. Let x1i be the x−coordinate of Li at y = 1.
(
If the slope of Li766
is zero—which may happen only for i = 1 and i = 2—then x0i and x1i are not767
defined. In what follows we shall give a special attention to this degenerate768
possibility.
)
Using the new notation, our results so far can be rewritten as769
y12 > y11 , y02 > y01 , x04 < x03 , x14 < x13 . (25)
Observe that L2 and L4 both have positive height at x = 1
(
i.e. y12 =770
b32
b12
> 0 and y14 =
b23−b24
b14−b24 > 0 by (20h0) and (20e0)
)
and that the heights771
of L1 and L3 are both less than 1 at x = 0
(
i.e. y01 = 1 − b41b21 < 1 and772
y03 =
b23−b43
b23−b13 < 1 by (20c0) and (20g0)
)
:773
y12 > 0 , y14 > 0 , y01 < 1 , y03 < 1. (26)
In view of inequalities (20c), (20e), (20h), (20g), we obtain that774
y12 > y13 > 0 , y01 < y04 < 1 , x04 < x03 < 1 , x13 > x14 > 0. (27)
Combining the very first inequalities in (25) and in (27), we conclude that775
y12 > max{y11, y13} > 0. (28)
Note that y14 > 0 is equivalent to x04 < 1 and y14 ≤ 1 is equivalent to776
x14 ≥ 1. There are several equivalencies of the types above, e.g. the equiva-777
lence between x13 > 0 and y03 < 1 etc.778
779
From now on, we have to distinguish CASES 1,2,3,4 depending on the780
sign of the slopes of L1 and L2.781
782
35
CASE 1. Assume that L1 and L2 have nonnegative slopes.783
CASE 2. Assume that L1 has negative slope and L2 has nonnegative slope.784
CASE 3. Assume that L1 has nonnegative slope and L2 has negative slope.785
CASE 4. Assume that L1 and L2 have negative slopes.786
787
In view of (24), Slope(L1) =
b41−b31
b21
and the Slope(L2) =
b32−b42
b12
.788
Within each CASE, recalling y12 > 0 and y14 > 0 from (26), we have
three subcases according to
(i) 0 < y14 ≤ 1 , (ii) 0 < y12 ≤ 1 & y14 > 1 , (iii) y12 > 1 & y14 > 1.
In Cases 1(i), 2(i), 3(i), 4(i), 1(ii), 2(ii), 3(ii), and 4(ii), our choice for x =
x∗ ∈ [0, 1] and y = y∗ ∈ [0, 1] will be
(x∗, y∗) = (1,min{y12, y14} − ε) where ε > 0 is sufficiently small.
In view of inequality (28) and assumption 0 < y14 ≤ 1 (for (i)) or assumptions789
0 < y12 ≤ 1 and y14 > 1 (for (ii)), (x∗, y∗) is above L1, below L2 and to the790
right of L4. Thus, the mutant strategy of species 1 will dominate a convex791
combination of the two resident strategies if (x∗, y∗) is to the left of L3. That792
is, it remains to check that793
y14 > max{y11, y13}. (29)
Case 1(i). Recall that y14 ≤ 1 is equivalent to x14 ≥ 1. With the help794
of a little plane geometry, y14 > y13 is implied
17 by x04 < x03 < 1 and795
1 ≤ x14 < x13. In order to prove inequality y14 > y11, the cases Slope(L1) > 0796
and Slope(L1) = 0 will be considered separately. Note that the lines L2, L3,797
and L4 are already fixed. If Slope(L1) > 0, then x11 is defined and satisfies798
x14 < x11. In fact, x14 =
b14
b34
< b41
b41−b31 = x11 follows directly from assump-799
tion b41 > b31 and (20f). Combining 1 ≤ x14 < x11 and y01 < y04 < 1 (the800
second chain of inequalities in (27)), inequality y14 > y11 follows by an ele-801
mentary geometric argument for two lines in the plane. The degenerate case802
Slope(L1) = 0 is easier. Then x11 does not exist but y11 = y01 < y04 < y14803
and we are done.804
805
17Note that a purely algebraic proof of inequality y14 =
b34−b24
b14−b24 >
b23
b23−b13 = y13 is
considerably harder. Elementary examples show that y14 ≥ y13 does not follow from
x04 < x03 < 1 and 0 < x14 < x13. Thus the equivalence between y14 ≤ 1 and x14 ≥ 1 (due
to the fact that the slope of L4 is positive) leads to a crucial improvement of (27).
36
Case 1(ii). By using (28), both y11 < 1 and y13 < 1 follow from assump-806
tion 0 < y12 ≤ 1. Since y14 > 1, we conclude that inequality (29) holds true807
in the slightly stronger form y14 > 1 > max{y11, y13}.808
809
The proof of inequality y14 > y11 in Case 1(i) above works also in Case810
3(i). For the remaining Cases 2(i) and 4(i), the slope of L1 is negative811
(and the slope of L4 is positive). Thus y14 > y11 is a direct consequence of812
inequality y01 < y04 in (27). Fortunately, the proofs of inequality y14 > y13813
are the same in Cases 1(i), 2(i), 3(i), and 4(i). Moreover, the proof in Case814
1(ii) can be repeated in Cases 2(ii), 3(ii), and 4(ii), too. Absolutely no815
modifications are needed.816
Thus only Cases 1(iii), 2(iii), 3(iii), and 4(iii) are left. We claim that an817
(x∗, y∗) in the unit square of the form (x∗, 1) will work in all these cases. Re-818
call that, by assumption, y12 > 1 and y14 > 1. Similarly, y13 > 0 by (27). In819
what follows, inequalities from (25)–(27) will be recalled without any further820
notice.821
822
Case 1(iii). If y11 < 1 and y13 < 1, then we can take (x
∗, y∗) = (1, 1) (i.e.823
the mutant phenotype of species 1 dominates its resident phenotype).824
If y11 ≥ 1, both the existence of x11 and inequality 0 < x11 ≤ 1 are implied825
by y01 < 1 ≤ y11. As a by–product, we obtain that Slope(L1) > 0. Recall826
that 0 < x14 < x13. The argument we used in Case 1(i) leads to x14 < x11827
again. In what follows we distinguish two cases according as Slope(L2) > 0828
or Slope(L2) = 0. Suppose that Slope(L2) > 0. Then y01 < y02 < y12829
and y11 < y12 give rise both to the existence of x12 and to inequality x12 <830
x11. Since 0 < max{1, y13} < y12 and x02 < x03
(
i.e. −b42
b32−b42 < 1 − b23b43831
by (20d) when b32 − b42 > 0 which is equivalent to Slope(L2) > 0
)
with832
x03 < 1, also inequality x12 < x13 holds true. All in all, we arrived at833
the chain of inequalities 1 ≥ min{x11, x13} > max{0, x12, x14} and can take834
(x∗, y∗) = (min{x11, x13} − ε, 1). In the degenerate case Slope(L2) = 0, we835
have 0 < x11 ≤ 1, x14 < x11 and 0 < x14 < x13. In particular, 0 < x14 <836
min{x11, x13} ≤ 1. Given x ∈ [0, x11) arbitrarily, (x, 1) is (strictly) below L2837
and above L1. For x ∈ (x14, x13), (x, 1) is to the left of L3 and to the right838
of L4. Thus the choice (x
∗, y∗) = (min{x11, x13} − ε, 1) is still possible.839
If y11 < 1 and y13 ≥ 1, consider first the special case Slope(L1) ≥ 0 and840
Slope(L2) = 0. Since y11 < 1 < y12, all points on the top edge of the unit841
square (i.e. for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and y = 1) are (strictly) below L2 and above842
37
L1. Combining inequalities 0 < x14 < x13 and y03 < 1 ≤ y13, we arrive at843
0 < x14 < x13 ≤ 1. In particular, we can take (x∗, y∗) = (x13 − ε, 1). Now844
we turn our attention to the special case Slope(L1) > 0 and Slope(L2) > 0.845
Thus `1, `2, `3, `4 are strictly increasing functions. This implies the existence846
of the intersection points x11, x12, x13, x14. Clearly 0 < x14 < x13 ≤ 1. The847
derivation of inequalities x14 < x11 and x12 < x13 is exactly the same as in848
the case y11 ≥ 1 above. The remaining inequality x12 < x11 follows from the849
chains of inequalities y01 < y02 < y12, y01 < y11 < 1 < y12 via an easy geo-850
metric argument. Depending on the relative position of y02, y11 and 1 in the851
open interval (y01, y12), we have to consider three separate subcases, namely852
y11 < 1 ≤ y02, y02 ≤ y11 < 1 or y11 ≤ y02 ≤ 1. (If y11 ≤ y02 ≤ 1, then one of853
the inequalities should be strict.) In each of the three subcases, we arrive at854
inequality x12 < 1 < x11. Again, an appropriate choice in the unit square is855
(x∗, y∗) = (min{x11, x13} − ε, 1). Finally, consider now the remaining special856
case Slope(L1) = 0 and Slope(L2) > 0. As before, 0 < x14 < x13 ≤ 1 and857
x12 < x13 (and y11 < 1, y12 > 1). For x ∈ (x14, x13), (x, 1) is to the left of858
L3 and to the right of L4. Given x ∈ (x12, 1] arbitrarily, (x, 1) is (strictly)859
below L2 and above L1. Thus the choice (x
∗, y∗) = (x13−ε, 1) is appropriate.860
861
Case 2(iii). If Slope(L1) < 0 and Slope(L2) = 0, then 1 > y01 > y11 and862
y02 > y12 > 1. Thus all points on the top edge of the unit square are (strictly)863
above L1 and below L2. Since 0 < x14 < x13 and x14 < 1 (by using y14 > 1864
and Slope(L4) > 0), we can take (x
∗, y∗) = (x14 + ε, 1). If Slope(L1) < 0865
and Slope(L2) > 0, then x12 exists and (by using y12 > 1) satisfies x12 < 1.866
Similarly, x14 < 1 and x11 < 0. As in the proof of Case 1(iii), inequalities867
x02 < x03 < 1 and max{1, y13} < y12 imply via some geometry that x12 < x13.868
In view of 0 < x14 < x13, we can take (x
∗, y∗) = (max{x12, x14}+ ε, 1). Note869
that the choice (x∗, y∗) = (min{1, x13} − ε, 1) is also possible.870
871
Case 3(iii). Since Slope(L2) < 0, we have y02 > y12. As a trivial conse-872
quence of assumption y12 > 1, all points on the top edge of the unit square873
are (strictly) below L2. In addition, x12 > 1. Similarly, assumption y14 > 1874
implies that x14 < 1. Recall that, from (27), 0 < x14 < x13. Last but not875
least, the proof of inequality x14 < x11 in Case 1(i) with Slope(L1) > 0 can876
be repeated and leads to (x∗, y∗) = (x14+ε, 1). If Slope(L1) = 0, then y01 < 1877
implies that the choice (x∗, y∗) = (x14 + ε, 1) is still possible.878
879
Case 4(iii). Every point on the top edge of the unit square is (strictly)880
38
above L1 and below L2. Recall that 0 < x14 < x13 and note that x14 < 1 by881
assumption y14 > 1. As above, we can take (x
∗, y∗) = (x14 + ε, 1). 882
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